December 9, 2025 — SCOTUS AM

The Eisenhower Executive Office Building — the large ornate building next to the White House historically called the Old Executive Office Building — is a designated national historic landmark. The administration announced plans to paint it white, apparently to visually match the White House. A coalition including historic preservation groups challenged the project. Two federal statutes were at the center of the case: NEPA (the National Environmental Policy Act) and NHPA (the National Historic Preservation Act). NHPA requires federal agencies to consider the impact of proposed actions on properties listed on the National Register of Historic Places, including landmarks, before proceeding. The district court issued a preliminary injunction halting the painting project, finding that the administration had not conducted the required review and that harm to the landmark — once the paint goes on — would be difficult or impossible to reverse. Bryan explained the significance beyond the specific building: NHPA exists precisely to slow down decisions that would cause irreversible change to historically significant structures. The injunction kept the building unpainted while the required review process could proceed.

Alina Habba had been serving as the U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey. Her appointment was challenged on Appointments Clause grounds. U.S. Attorneys are Officers of the United States — "inferior officers" under the Appointments Clause — who must be nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate, or appointed through a valid statutory mechanism. The challenge focused on whether her appointment followed the required process. A judge ruled that it had not — that Habba was improperly appointed and therefore lacked the legal authority to serve as U.S. Attorney. Following that ruling, Habba announced she would step down from the position. Bryan covered this as a live example of the Appointments Clause operating as a structural constraint: the clause isn't just procedural formality, it determines whether someone has actual legal authority to exercise the powers of an office. An improperly appointed U.S. Attorney could theoretically have their prosecutorial acts challenged on the basis of their invalid appointment.

Bryan used NRSC v. FEC to teach the architecture of campaign finance law going back to Buckley v. Valeo (1976). Buckley drew a constitutional line: the government can limit contributions to campaigns (money given to a candidate) but cannot limit independent expenditures (money spent on your own, not coordinated with the campaign), because the anti-corruption rationale only applies to direct contributions. Citizens United (2010) extended this to corporations and unions — they can make unlimited independent expenditures because there's no corruption concern if the spending isn't coordinated. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC (Colorado I, 1996) then asked about party coordinated expenditures — can a political party spend unlimited amounts in coordination with its own candidate? The Court said yes for truly independent party spending. Colorado II (2001) narrowed this: parties still face limits on spending that is coordinated with the campaign. NRSC v. FEC challenged those coordinated expenditure limits directly. The National Republican Senatorial Committee argued it should be able to spend unlimited coordinated money with its Senate candidates — that the anti-corruption rationale doesn't apply when it's the party spending on behalf of its own nominee. Bryan explained why this matters: if the Court removes coordinated expenditure limits for parties, you've essentially eliminated a major distinction in campaign finance law between unlimited independent spending and the contribution limits that were supposed to prevent quid-pro-quo corruption.