The Posse Comitatus order issued Wednesday doesn't take effect until a week from Friday. But California isn't waiting. They immediately filed for a new preliminary injunction asking for the National Guard back — because the original emergency no longer exists. The federal government responded by extending the deployment another 90 days past election day. California: that might be the point. Trump had said he wanted the military to "handle" the last election. The military's own policy prohibits even the perception of voter coercion. California asked for an expedited schedule.
Newsom v. Trump (25-cv-04870) had immediate post-ruling developments after Wednesday's Posse Comitatus opinion. California filed a new preliminary injunction motion asking the court to return National Guard control to Governor Newsom on the grounds that the original stated reason for the deployment — civil unrest — no longer exists. Without civil unrest, the only remaining military activities are the law enforcement operations the court just ruled violate Posse Comitatus. Simultaneously, the federal government submitted a new order extending the National Guard deployment another 90 days. California identified a significant concern: the deployment is expected to last just past a California special election date. Bryan quoted Trump's own statement that he wanted the military to "handle last year's national election." California also cited the Department of Defense's long-standing policy against any military presence that could create "the possibility or perception of voter coercion or intimidation." The expedited schedule request was based on the election nexus — California wanted resolution before the military presence could affect voter turnout. Meanwhile, the government also filed an appeal to the 9th Circuit, which could stay the district court's order while the appeal is pending.
Posse Comitatus Actpreliminary injunction (post-opinion)National Guard deployment extension (90 days)election interference nexusvoter intimidationmilitary presence near special election9th Circuit appealstay pending appeal
Constitutional question: The intersection of military deployment and elections raises First and Fourteenth Amendment concerns beyond Posse Comitatus: the right to vote is a fundamental constitutional right, and government action that chills the exercise of that right — even without explicitly targeting it — implicates strict scrutiny. The DOD's own policy against military involvement in elections exists precisely because the Founders were deeply suspicious of using armed force in the vicinity of democratic processes. California's theory — that the deployment timed to run through election day, combined with Trump's public statements about military involvement in elections, creates a constitutional election interference problem — is a novel and potentially powerful argument that goes beyond the Posse Comitatus ruling.
The government appealed the Abramowitz ruling and asked for a stay. The judge denied the stay and, in the denial, quoted the Constitution directly back at DOJ. "Defendants come back to this court beating the dead horse that requiring board approval constitutes a dramatic interference with the president's power to remove Abramowitz." Then she read them Article II, Section 2 — which says Congress may by law vest appointment of inferior officers in heads of departments. Not exclusively the president. Abramowitz stays.
Abramowitz v. Lake (25-cv-00887) produced a follow-up ruling on September 3. After last week's summary judgment and permanent injunction barring Kari Lake from firing VOA director Michael Abramowitz without board approval, the government immediately appealed and filed a motion for a stay pending the appeal. The judge denied the stay, finding the government unlikely to succeed on the merits. The denial was notable for its direct constitutional engagement: the government continued to press its argument that the president has inherent Article II authority to remove any executive officer, regardless of what Congress says. The judge quoted Article II, §2 back at them: Congress "may, by law, vest the appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper" in heads of departments — meaning that the appointment power (and therefore the removal power) over inferior officers is not exclusively presidential. Congress has the constitutional authority to assign those powers elsewhere. The board-approval requirement for removing Abramowitz is exactly that kind of congressional assignment. Bryan's summary: "the defendants come back beating the dead horse" quote is the judge saying your constitutional argument was already wrong the first time, and it's still wrong on the stay.
Stay pending appeallikelihood of success on meritsArticle II §2 (appointments clause)inferior officerscongressional assignment of removal power"dead horse" denial
Constitutional question: Article II, §2 says Congress may vest the appointment of inferior officers in the president alone, courts of law, or heads of departments — not that it must vest them in the president. The government's removal-power argument depends on reading the Appointments Clause to make presidential removal the constitutional default for all executive officers. The text doesn't support that. The judge's quotation of the provision is a reminder that constitutional arguments require engaging with what the Constitution actually says, not just what a preferred executive-power theory would require. The VOA case's constitutional significance is precisely about whether Congress can insulate agency leadership from presidential removal when the agency's statutory mission requires editorial independence — a question that will eventually return to the Supreme Court.
The IRS signed an agreement to share taxpayer data with ICE. Bryan's reaction: "Yeah. Yeah." Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly issued a list of five pre-hearing questions. One: ICE requested data on 1.28 million people on June 27 — how did ICE come up with that list? Two: On August 7, IRS released data on 47,000 people — did you follow the laws that require a specific statute attached to each name? Five: "If you violated the law, what do you recommend I do?" Bryan: "I absolutely love this lady."
Center for Taxpayer Rights v. IRS (25-cv-00457) is a challenge to an agreement the IRS signed to share taxpayer data with ICE. The case was before Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly (a Reagan and Clinton appointee, on the bench since Bryan was five years old). Rather than proceeding in the usual adversarial exchange of motions, the judge issued five written pre-hearing questions she expected the parties to be prepared to answer. The questions: (1) Did the IRS enter into a separate implementing agreement for the information exchange, and if so, what are its terms? (2) On June 27, ICE requested data on approximately 1.28 million people — what was the IRS's understanding of how ICE created that list? (3) On August 7, the IRS released data on approximately 47,000 people — did the IRS comply with laws that require a specific statute to be attached to each individual's information? (4) In a related case, a prior preliminary injunction was denied on the basis that the agreement didn't require law violations — did you actually violate the law, and if so, should that prior injunction have been issued? (5) If you violated the law and are continuing to do so, what injunction remedy do you recommend the court impose? Bryan found question five particularly striking: the court was not just asking whether a violation occurred, but asking the violating party to propose its own remedy.
IRS-ICE data sharing agreementtaxpayer privacy laws (26 U.S.C. §6103)law enforcement exception requirements (statute per individual)pre-hearing written questions (unusual judicial procedure)1.28 million ICE data request47,000 data releaseprior PI denial
Constitutional question: The IRS data-sharing arrangement implicates the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches — tax returns are submitted under compulsion, with the understanding that the government will use them only for tax purposes. Using compelled financial disclosures for immigration enforcement is a different governmental purpose than the one for which the information was gathered. The scale (1.28 million names requested) also raises due process concerns: a mass data pull cannot have individualized probable cause or reasonable suspicion for each of those individuals. Judge Kollar-Kotelly's pre-hearing questions are designed to build a record that either confirms the violation or forecloses any claim of compliance — either way, the hearing that follows will have a fully developed factual foundation.
A Trump DEI executive order told every government agency to remove "woke" language. CDC, NIH, HHS sites went dark — no warning, no transition, just gone. Doctors who relied on that data to treat patients sued. Doctors for America already won. Washington State Medical Association: the government just threw in the towel. They agreed to put everything back. Bryan: "These are super qualified physicians working in high-stress jobs. They say they need this stuff. I am not going to argue with them."
Washington State Medical Association v. Kennedy (25-cv-00955) is part of a cluster of cases filed by physicians and healthcare organizations challenging the Trump administration's DEI executive order's impact on federal health information websites. The order directed agencies to remove DEI and "woke" language from government sites. The implementation was blunt: entire portions of CDC, NIH, HHS, and related sites were taken down without warning, including medical information that practicing physicians relied on — clinical guidelines, treatment protocols, disease surveillance data, public health resources. Healthcare providers sued because the takedowns had real patient care impacts. As of September 3-4, several of these cases were resolving. Doctors for America had already closed out a few weeks earlier. In WSMA v. Kennedy, the government agreed to restore all of the taken-down medical information — essentially conceding that the takedown was overbroad. Bryan's assessment: the administration had recognized this wasn't a fight worth having. Bryan disclaimed any ability to evaluate the clinical necessity of the specific content, but deferred entirely to the doctors: if they say they need it, they need it.
DEI executive orderAPA arbitrary and capriciousFirst Amendment (government speech limits)overbroad implementationCDCNIHHHS website takedownsconsent to restore information
Constitutional question: The DEI executive order's impact on health information raises a subtle but important constitutional issue: the government's ability to speak or not speak (government speech doctrine) is generally broad, but when the government has established programs that medical professionals depend on for patient care decisions, abruptly withdrawing that information without notice or replacement implicates the substantive due process interests of those practitioners and their patients. More fundamentally, the cases show a consistent pattern in the 2025 DEI order litigation: executive orders drafted with political intent have operationalized effects that harm real people in real ways, and the courts have been a check against the collateral damage of implementation that outstrips the stated purpose of the order.
