The 5th Circuit essentially overturned the Trump administration's use of the Alien Enemies Act of 1789 against Venezuelans. The court said: you are not at war with Tren de Aragua. You are not at war with Venezuela. Congress never declared war. The president cannot invoke this 1798 wartime detention law without an actual declaration from Congress.
W.M.M. v. Trump (25-10534) is the 5th Circuit case on the Trump administration's invocation of the Alien Enemies Act of 1798. Background: the Trump administration claimed that the Venezuelan gang Tren de Aragua had "invaded" the United States, allowing the president to invoke the Alien Enemies Act — which permits detention and deportation of nationals of enemy nations during wartime — against any Venezuelan the president identified as a gang member. The Supreme Court had already held that courts could review AEA invocations and returned the case to the 5th Circuit on the notice question. As of September 3, the 5th Circuit resolved both remaining issues. On notice: the government's notice requirements were deemed adequate at seven days (one judge dissented on this). On the main question: the court held — 2-1 — that the U.S. is not at war with Tren de Aragua or Venezuela, that no formal declaration of war exists, and that the president cannot invoke the Alien Enemies Act without one. The AEA requires an actual declared war with a foreign nation; a presidential proclamation that a gang has "invaded" does not satisfy that requirement. Bryan expected the case to return to the Supreme Court.
Alien Enemies Act of 1798invocation requirements (declared war vs. presidential proclamation)Tren de Aragua designationFifth Circuit reviewnotice requirements (7 days)2-1 majority
Constitutional question: The Alien Enemies Act is one of the oldest federal statutes, originally passed as part of the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798. Its invocation has always required a formally declared war because the law's power — detention and deportation of enemy nationals — is a wartime emergency power, not a general executive tool. The constitutional structure divides war-declaration authority between Congress (Article I) and the commander-in-chief function (Article II); the AEA expressly requires that congressional declaration to activate. The Trump administration's attempt to expand this power to cover an undeclared "invasion" by a non-state actor (a gang) would transform a narrow wartime statute into a broad executive deportation tool reviewable by no one — precisely what the 5th Circuit rejected.
The Newsom v. Trump ruling on the National Guard in California: the military was trained to follow Posse Comitatus. Then the training was altered — in red text — to carve out an exception for crowd control, traffic control, security patrols, riot control. The court: you knew what you were doing. You willfully changed the training to permit things you knew were violations. The National Guard must stop those activities. The ruling is limited to California — but if it survives appeal, every similar deployment will answer to it.
Newsom v. Trump (25-cv-04870) is the California district court case challenging President Trump's deployment of the National Guard to enforce immigration law in California. Bryan had covered the detailed opinion the day before (September 2 TT clip). The September 3 Morning Report gave the short version: earlier in 2025, Trump declared emergencies in California, sent in the National Guard, and instructed them to conduct operations — security patrols, traffic control, crowd control — that the Posse Comitatus Act prohibits military from performing. The government tried to justify these activities under two theories: (1) the president's Take Care Clause authority (Article II, §3) to faithfully execute the laws, and (2) an implied constitutional exception to Posse Comitatus. The court rejected both. On the Take Care Clause: the clause gives the president power to execute laws written by Congress, not his own executive orders. On implied exceptions: Posse Comitatus allows only express constitutional or congressional exceptions — implied powers don't qualify. The court also found the violations willful: training documents were altered to include exceptions (written in red), and agencies were coached on how to phrase requests to appear compliant. Remedy: limited to California; troops don't have to withdraw; but the listed illegal activities (traffic control, narcotics raids, crowd control, etc.) cannot continue.
Posse Comitatus ActTake Care Clause (Art. II §3)Youngstown Sheet and Tubeexpress vs. implied constitutional exceptionswillfulness findinggeographic limitation of order (California only)
Constitutional question: The Take Care Clause (Art. II, §3) means the president faithfully executes laws Congress writes, not laws he creates himself. The clause makes him the executor of legislative power, not a source of additional power. When Trump issued memoranda declaring emergencies and using those memoranda as authority for the military deployment, he was claiming the right to execute his own directives — the exact maneuver Youngstown Sheet and Tube (1952) rejected when Truman tried to seize steel mills by executive order. Posse Comitatus is a congressional limit on exactly this: using the military as a domestic law enforcement tool. The willfulness finding is constitutionally significant — it documents that the executive knew it was violating the law and chose to do so anyway, which strengthens the case for future contempt proceedings if the violations continue.
No president has ever tried to fire a Federal Reserve governor. Trump just tried. The allegation against Dr. Lisa Cook — decorated economist, Spelman, Oxford, Berkeley, Treasury, Council of Economic Advisers — comes from Bill Pulte, director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency, who accused her of mortgage fraud. The same Bill Pulte who accused Adam Schiff of mortgage fraud. The judge set an expedited schedule but said Cook stays in her position until briefing is complete.
Cook v. Trump (25-cv-02903) is a new case filed at the end of August 2025. President Trump attempted to remove Lisa Cook from the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. Dr. Cook is a credentialed economist — Spelman College, Oxford, UC Berkeley — with prior government service in the Treasury Department and Council of Economic Advisers. The basis for removal: allegations of mortgage fraud raised by Bill Pulte, the director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency. Bryan flagged that Pulte had made the same fraud allegation against Adam Schiff, casting doubt on the allegation's credibility. Federal Reserve Board governors are appointed to staggered 14-year terms and can only be removed "for cause" — the statutory protection designed to insulate monetary policy from political pressure. Trump had previously tried and failed to force Chairman Jerome Powell to resign. Going after Dr. Cook is the next attempt. No president has ever removed a Federal Reserve Board governor. The judge, noting the uniqueness of the situation, set an expedited briefing schedule for a TRO or injunction or summary judgment proceeding, but Cook remains in her position during the briefing.
Federal Reserve Board removal protection"for cause" removal standard14-year term appointmentsFHFA director allegations (Bill Pulte)expedited TROinjunction schedule
Constitutional question: The Federal Reserve's independence from political pressure is a structural economic safeguard built into its appointment and removal statutes. Congressional insulation of the FRB reflects the legislature's judgment that monetary policy decisions — interest rates, inflation targets — are both inevitably unpopular and economically necessary, and that short-term political pressure would make them worse. The presidential removal power doctrine (Myers, Humphrey's Executor, Seila Law) allows Congress to protect some officers from at-will removal to serve specific regulatory functions. The FRB is arguably the paradigm case: monetary policy is exactly the kind of technocratic, long-term function where insulation from political whim is the point. Whether the current Supreme Court's increasingly skeptical view of for-cause removal protections extends to the FRB is the constitutional question the Cook case will eventually force.
