Garcia's attorneys filed a second petition in his criminal case in Nashville asking the court to enforce the rule that says parties can't publicly trash the defendant before trial. The problem: the "parties" include Homeland Security, who aren't in the courtroom but are part of "the United States" in the caption. The judge wasn't sure last time whether he had jurisdiction over them. He'll have to figure that out.
US v. Garcia (25-cr-00115) had a procedural filing on August 28. Garcia's criminal attorneys petitioned the court — for the second time — to enforce a federal criminal rule (approximately Criminal Rule 23.1 or Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 57.7) that prohibits parties from making public statements about a defendant's character that could influence the jury pool before trial. The rule applies to all parties in a criminal case captioned "United States v. Defendant." The complication: the Trump administration's various agencies — Homeland Security, the Justice Department, political principals — had all been making public statements about Garcia, but Homeland Security isn't directly present in the Nashville courtroom. Because the case is United States v. Garcia, Homeland Security is technically part of "the United States" as a party and bound by the rule. But the criminal judge had been uncertain whether he had jurisdiction to issue orders to agencies like Homeland Security that are connected to the case as party components but not before him as courtroom parties. Garcia's attorneys' second petition pushed the question: if things get worse, the judge may need to act. Bryan: it's complex, but the judge will have to figure it out.
Criminal Rule gag orderpretrial publicity ruleparty definition in U.S. v. [Defendant] formatjurisdiction over executive branch agencies not present in courtroom
Constitutional question: The gag rule in criminal proceedings is a Sixth Amendment protection: the right to a fair trial by an impartial jury requires that the defendant not be tried in the court of public opinion before the actual jury is seated. When the entire executive branch is simultaneously the prosecution and the public communicator about the defendant, the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of an impartial jury is directly at risk. The judge's jurisdictional uncertainty about Homeland Security illustrates a structural gap: the constitutional protection exists, but the procedural mechanism to enforce it against executive agencies operating outside the courtroom isn't clearly established.
Kari Lake tried to fire Michael Abramowitz, the director of the Voice of America. The problem: the law says he can only be removed by an advisory board. He sued. Yesterday a judge — Reagan-appointed, on the bench since 1987 — issued summary judgment in Abramowitz's favor. The DOJ filed "a slew of threshold arguments" not to reach the merits. One actual defense: the board-removal requirement violates the president's constitutional authority to fire anyone he wants. The judge was not swayed.
Abramowitz v. Lake (25-cv-00887) is part of the larger Voice of America case. Kari Lake, appointed as director of the US Agency for Global Media (which oversees VOA), attempted to fire Michael Abramowitz, the director of Voice of America. The legal problem: federal statute establishes that the VOA director is appointed by and can only be removed by a statutory advisory board — not unilaterally by the agency head. Abramowitz filed a motion for summary judgment and permanent injunction, arguing the law is clear and Lake had no authority to fire him without board action. The DOJ's response was described by the judge as "a slew" of threshold arguments for why the court should not reach the merits at all — not an endorsement of that description. The DOJ raised one actual substantive defense: that the statutory requirement of board approval for firing violated the president's inherent constitutional authority to remove executive officers. The judge was not persuaded. The summary judgment was granted and the permanent injunction issued — Kari Lake cannot fire Abramowitz without the board's action. Note: this ruling addressed only the firing question; other aspects of the VOA shutdown litigation (shuttering the programming, cutting staff) remain pending. Bryan checked: the judge was a Reagan appointee who has been on the bench since 1987.
Removal powerstatutory protections for agency directoradvisory board as removal authoritysummary judgmentpermanent injunctionSeila Law
Constitutional question: The presidential removal power debate goes back to Myers v. United States (1926) and runs through Morrison v. Olson, Free Enterprise Fund, Seila Law, and Collins v. Yellen. The current doctrinal framework allows Congress to protect some inferior officers with "for cause" removal protections but not principal officers in single-director agencies. VOA's advisory board structure is distinct from both: it's a multi-member body making removal decisions, not a "for cause" protection per se. The judge's rejection of the DOJ's one defense suggests the board-approval mechanism is distinguishable from the kinds of removal protections the Supreme Court has invalidated. The broader VOA case raises the same question as every independent agency case: can the president abolish or defang a congressionally mandated agency simply by firing its leadership and refusing to comply with statutory governance structures?
The DC Circuit reversed itself on Global Health Council. It will NOT rehear the case en banc after all. The three-judge panel's standing dismissal stands. Bryan: "I am so sick of this case." Plaintiffs will need to apply for cert at the Supreme Court or refile under a different legal theory.
Global Health Council v. Trump (25-cv-00402) reached what Bryan hoped was a final development on August 28. After granting en banc rehearing — reversing the three-judge panel's standing dismissal and restoring the payment obligation in the interim — the DC Circuit reversed that position as well: it would not be re-hearing the case en banc after all. The three-judge panel's dismissal for lack of standing, which had kicked off the whole en banc petition process, would stand. Bryan found the back-and-forth exhausting: grant, deny stay, "it never went into effect," then un-grant the en banc grant, all within a span of weeks. He acknowledged being "so sick of this case." The path forward for the Global Health Council plaintiffs: either petition the Supreme Court for certiorari (appealing the DC Circuit's standing ruling) or refile the case under a different legal theory that avoids the standing problem the three-judge panel identified. The standing dismissal had been based on who the plaintiffs were and what argument they'd made — which means a restructured plaintiff coalition or a different legal hook might survive.
En banc grant withdrawnthree-judge panel standing dismissal reinstatedcert petition as next steprefiling under alternative theory
Constitutional question: The standing problem that killed this case in the DC Circuit is constitutionally significant beyond GHC: if the organizations most directly harmed by grant terminations lack standing to challenge them (because of how they framed their injury or who they are), the availability of judicial review for executive grant cancellations depends on plaintiff selection rather than the merits of the constitutional claim. A standing doctrine that prevents the people actually harmed from getting to court is, as Bryan had noted, a structural constitutional problem — it makes the APA's judicial review provisions effectively optional depending on who brings the suit.
LULAC filed for summary judgment. The DOJ moved to strike it — they said they needed more time for discovery. Problem: in every single prior scheduling meeting, the government had said it needed no discovery. This case would be decided on law. Do not give us time to gather evidence. The judge: citing Greenlaw v. US, you told me you didn't need it and I let you decide. Now you don't get it back. "The entire opinion felt cold and furious," Bryan said. "But I couldn't point to one spot where she sounded anything but even-handed and professional."
LULAC v. Executive Office of the President (25-cv-00946) produced a memorable opinion from Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly on August 28. The League of United Latin American Citizens had filed a motion for summary judgment — essentially asking the court to rule in their favor based on the evidence already in the record, without a full trial. The DOJ responded with a motion to strike, deny, or defer LULAC's summary judgment motion, arguing they hadn't had time to complete discovery and couldn't effectively oppose LULAC with no evidence. The judge's opinion walked through the scheduling history in considerable detail. In prior preliminary meetings, the government had consistently said — repeatedly and explicitly — that it did not want discovery. The case would be decided entirely on legal arguments. The government had declined every scheduling slot offered for evidence gathering. The judge had taken the government at its word and designed the schedule accordingly. Now, confronted with LULAC's evidence-supported summary judgment motion, the government claimed the schedule was unfair. The judge cited Greenlaw v. United States: courts operate on an adversarial premise, where parties know what is best for themselves and are responsible for advancing their own facts. You told me you didn't need time. I gave you adults the ability to make that decision. You made it. You don't get to unmake it now. Motion denied. Bryan's take: "The entire opinion felt cold and furious, but I couldn't point to one spot where she sounded anything but even-handed and professional. Gotta give it to her."
Summary judgmentmotion to strikediscovery waiver (scheduling estoppel)Greenlaw v. US (adversarial system principle)LULAC voting rightsEO 14248 (proof of citizenship)
Constitutional question: LULAC v. EOP is part of the cluster of voting rights cases challenging EO 14248's proof-of-citizenship requirements. The underlying constitutional issues — whether the executive can impose citizenship verification requirements on voters beyond what states and Congress have authorized, and whether such requirements burden the fundamental right to vote — are the substantive merits that will eventually be decided. The procedural ruling here is about the government getting to those merits: by waiving discovery to prevent LULAC from gathering evidence, and then claiming it couldn't defend without evidence, the government was trying to use procedural maneuvering to both prevent plaintiffs from proving their case and escape having to defend against a fully developed record. Judge Kollar-Kotelly's denial preserved the adversarial balance the Constitution's due process framework requires.
