"All citizens of Utah should be outraged at their activist judiciary, which wants to take away our congressional advantage." That was Trump's tweet after a Utah judge — appointed by a Republican governor — struck down Utah's new congressional maps. The legislature had ignored its own state's 2018 voter-approved independent redistricting law. The judge: rewarding the violation would "nullify the people's 2018 redistricting reform." New maps due September 24th.
LWV v. Utah Legislature (UT 220901712) is a state court case — the Utah state case number reflects that — challenging new Utah congressional district maps drawn by the legislature. In 2018, Utah voters approved Proposition 4, a ballot initiative requiring congressional districts to be drawn by an independent redistricting commission. Despite that voter mandate, the Utah legislature drew new maps in 2021 that disregarded Prop 4's standards and procedures, making the state more favorable to Republicans. A Utah judge — appointed by a Republican governor — struck down the maps on Monday, August 25. The judge found that the legislature "intentionally stripped away all of Proposition's core redistricting standards and procedures that were mandatory and binding on it." The remedy: lawmakers must redraw congressional districts in compliance with Prop 4 by September 24th. If the new maps don't satisfy the court's standards, the plaintiffs and other groups may submit their own map proposals for the court to consider. Trump responded on social media, calling the judge an "activist judiciary" trying to "take away our congressional advantage."
Voter initiativestate constitutional redistricting requirementsProp 4 (2018, Utah)independent redistricting commissionlegislative override of voter mandatecourt-imposed map deadline (September 24)
Constitutional question: While this is a state court case applying state law, it connects to the broader constitutional principle that elected officials cannot simply ignore voter-approved reforms that constrain their own power. In the federal context, the Guarantee Clause (Art. IV, §4) ensures a "republican form of government" to each state — including the ability of citizens to bind their legislators through direct democracy. A legislature that overrides a voter mandate on redistricting to entrench its own advantage is doing precisely what republican self-governance prohibits: using the power of government to insulate itself from electoral accountability.
The federal government sued Illinois because Illinois has laws protecting non-citizens. The judge dismissed it in July — without prejudice, giving the government a chance to refile with an amended complaint. They never did. The amendment window just closed. The judge: I've heard crickets. Dismissal upgraded to WITH prejudice. This one might actually be done. And if they appeal and lose, that precedent kills the identical US v. New York case too.
US v. Illinois (25-cv-01285) is one of two nearly identical cases — the other is US v. New York — where the federal government sued states for having laws that protect non-citizens from federal immigration enforcement. Bryan had mentioned these cases about a month earlier. The judge dismissed the Illinois case in July, but crucially did so without prejudice: the government was given a chance to file an amended complaint addressing the court's objections. The government never filed the amended complaint. On Tuesday, August 26, the judge issued a new order: the window for filing the amendment had passed, he'd received nothing from the government ("heard crickets"), and he was converting the dismissal to one with prejudice — meaning the case is over, permanently, and cannot be refiled in the same form. Bryan noted the staffing issues at DOJ as a possible factor in the failure to refile. On the appeal question: when the United States is a party, the appeal window extends from 30 to 60 days. But the government's appeal options are awkward — they can appeal the judge's original reasoning for dismissal (which they had a chance to fix and chose not to), or appeal the procedural conversion to with-prejudice, but they've effectively waived their best argument by not using the amendment opportunity. More importantly: if they appeal and lose, the loss becomes precedent that could kill US v. New York as well.
Without prejudice vs. with prejudice dismissalfailure to amend within leave periodDOJ staffing and litigation capacityappeal window (60 days for US parties)waiver of amendment opportunity
Constitutional question: The underlying constitutional issue in both cases is the anti-commandeering doctrine: can the federal government compel states to eliminate their own laws protecting non-citizens, as a condition of avoiding federal lawsuit? The Supreme Court's anti-commandeering precedent (Printz v. United States, Murphy v. NCAA) says no — the federal government cannot order states to implement or undo their own law. By suing rather than relying on preemption, the government tried to use the courts as the enforcement mechanism, which the court rejected. The dismissal with prejudice is a quiet but significant constitutional outcome: a court has held that the federal government cannot use this particular mechanism to override state protective legislation.
Dr. Alawieh is a kidney transplant surgeon and Brown University professor. She was on an H-1B visa, returning home to Boston from visiting family overseas. When she landed at Logan Airport, she was detained, her phone was taken, and she was immediately deported. Her attorneys filed something interesting: the CBP employees who handled her case — swearing her in, taking statements, deciding her fate — were acting like judges. But they weren't appointed judges. Under Kennedy v. Braidwood, the extent of power you wield determines whether you're an officer subject to the Appointments Clause. These guys had a lot of power.
Alawieh v. Tweedie (25-cv-10614) is a challenge to the deportation of Dr. Alawieh, a kidney transplant specialist and faculty member at Brown University's medical school. She was traveling on an H-1B visa and returning home to Boston from an overseas family visit when she was detained at Logan Airport by border control, had her phone confiscated, and was immediately deported without any of the procedural protections that would attend a formal immigration proceeding. Her attorneys filed an argument Bryan found novel and worth sharing: the CBP employees who handled her case at the airport were not merely performing ministerial functions. They swore her in, took her statements, conducted the entire substantive proceeding, decided the outcome, and executed the removal — functioning as a court with no possibility of appeal. That level of power, her attorneys argued, makes them "officers of the United States" under the Appointments Clause (Art. II, §2), and officers must be properly appointed — not just hired as low-level employees. They cited Kennedy v. Braidwood Management (a recent SCOTUS case from earlier that summer): the test for officer status is "the extent of power an individual wields in carrying out his assigned functions." By that standard, the airport CBP employees wielded a lot. If they were officers, they needed to be properly appointed — and if they weren't, then the deportation they executed was issued without proper authority and is void.
Appointments Clauseofficer vs. employee distinctionKennedy v. Braidwood (2025) (extent of power test)airport CBP employees as de facto officersH-1B deportation without formal proceeding
Constitutional question: The Appointments Clause is a structural constitutional provision: it separates the power to appoint officers of the United States (the president, with Senate confirmation for principal officers; the president, courts, or department heads for inferior officers) from the execution of official government power. Its purpose is to ensure accountability — someone must be answerable for the appointment of people who exercise significant government authority over individual liberty. When a CBP employee at an airport makes a final, unreviewable decision to deport a lawful H-1B visa holder, they are exercising exactly the kind of power the Appointments Clause was designed to constrain. Bryan's closing note: he expected to see this case reach the Supreme Court.
The government appealed the Alligator Alcatraz closure order and asked for a stay. The judge responded with a "rather flippant" 8-page denial. Diesel dripping into wetlands. Missing protective barriers. The government's motion was all about immigration policy, which the judge noted was "kind of irrelevant" to the environmental questions before her. Meanwhile: word is Florida is going to dismantle the facility almost immediately. Total cost: over $250 million to build, another $20-30 million to take down. Operated for about 60 days. Funded by FEMA. During hurricane season.
Friends of the Everglades v. Noem (25-cv-22896) — Alligator Alcatraz — continued with a follow-up ruling. After the court's previous order (no new detainees, stop construction, 60 days to remove fencing and infrastructure), the government responded with an immediate appeal to the 11th Circuit and a motion for a stay of the order pending that appeal. The court denied the stay. Bryan described the 8-page denial as "rather flippant": the judge cited specific documented harms — diesel dripping into the Everglades wetlands, the absence of protective barriers that should have been installed — as evidence of immediate danger to the surrounding environment. The government's arguments in the stay motion had focused on immigration policy and operational necessity, which the court noted was largely irrelevant to the environmental law questions at issue. Then Bryan dropped the final note: word was that the state of Florida intended to dismantle the facility almost immediately after receiving the ruling — not the federal government, but the state. The financial reality: the facility cost over $250 million to build and would cost at least $20-30 million to dismantle. It had operated for approximately 60 days. All of it was funded with FEMA money. During hurricane season — the months when Florida would be most likely to need those FEMA resources.
NEPAenvironmental harm (diesel in wetlands, protective barriers)stay standard (irreparable harm to the environment)immigration policy arguments as irrelevant to environmental stay11th Circuit appealstate of Florida dismantlement
Constitutional question: The FEMA funding angle has a constitutional dimension beyond waste: FEMA funds are congressionally appropriated for disaster relief and preparedness. Using them to build an immigration detention facility in a hurricane-prone state — with no environmental review — is exactly the kind of executive appropriations misdirection the Impoundment Control Act's spending requirements were designed to constrain. If the state of Florida dismantles the facility, the political accountability structure inverts: the Trump administration will have spent over $280 million in federal disaster funds to build something that lasted 60 days before the state it was located in tore it down.
