Morning Report

December 18, 2025 — Morning Report

Dec 18, 2025

1218 AM TT·Federal news Update Morning Report Dec 18 YT

AFL-CIO v. OMB 25-cv-08302 · 3:25-cv-08302

The continuing resolution that kept the government open included language barring reductions in force through January 30 — and a judge issued a TRO blocking the State Department from firing workers because that shutdown deal language had the force of law.

The federal government had been operating on a continuing resolution — a short-term spending bill that keeps agencies funded when Congress hasn't passed full appropriations. This particular CR included a provision specifically prohibiting reductions in force (RIFs) through January 30. The State Department proceeded with firings anyway. The AFL-CIO and affected workers sued, arguing the CR's anti-RIF language had the same legal force as any other congressional appropriations rider — the administration was legally barred from conducting layoffs through the CR's expiration date, and it did it anyway. The court issued a temporary restraining order blocking the State Department firings. Bryan explained the legal significance: appropriations bills and their riders — including continuing resolutions — are binding federal law. When Congress includes a prohibition on agency action in spending legislation, the executive cannot override it by claiming managerial authority. The administration's position that it retained discretion to conduct RIFs regardless of the CR language was, in the court's view, simply wrong — that's not how appropriations law works.

Constitutional question: The Spending Clause and congressional power: when Congress conditions appropriated funds on restrictions against RIFs, that condition is part of the law the executive must follow — not a suggestion. The constitutional question is whether the executive can conduct agency reorganizations that Congress has expressly prohibited through the appropriations process.

Treas. Un. v. Vought 25-cv-00381 · 1:25-cv-00381

A court had previously found that CFPB's funding through the Federal Reserve was constitutional — and the administration was back at the DC Circuit trying to undo an injunction that had blocked mass firings at the agency.

The CFPB (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau) is funded through draws on the Federal Reserve rather than through the annual appropriations process — an arrangement the Supreme Court upheld in CFPB v. CFSA (2024) against an Appropriations Clause challenge. The administration had attempted mass firings at the CFPB; a lower court had entered an injunction blocking those firings. By December 2025 the case was in the DC Circuit on the administration's appeal. Bryan covered the appeal as part of the broader pattern of cases where the administration was trying to dismantle independent agencies and their protections. The CFPB case sat alongside Humphrey's Executor (the FTC case pending at SCOTUS) as a test of whether the president could remove officers and dismantle agencies Congress had insulated from at-will removal. The DC Circuit's treatment of the CFPB mass-firing injunction would turn on whether the employees had statutory removal protections and whether the injunction was properly entered.

Constitutional question: The removal power and independent agencies: Congress created the CFPB with specific protections for its employees and structure. If the president can unilaterally fire those employees notwithstanding statutory protections, Humphrey's Executor is effectively dead — and the independence of all agencies with for-cause removal protections is eliminated.

Tincher v. Noem 25-cv-04669 · 0:25-cv-04669

Minneapolis passed an ordinance blocking ICE from conducting enforcement operations in certain protected spaces — and the judge who blocked Chicago's similar ordinance in CHC v. Noem ruled this one was constitutional because it was narrower.

Bryan had covered CHC v. Noem — the Chicago Headline Club case — where Chicago's attempt to restrict ICE operations near sensitive locations had been blocked. The Minneapolis ordinance in Tincher v. Noem covered similar ground: it restricted ICE enforcement activity near certain protected spaces like schools, hospitals, and churches. The key difference was scope. The Minneapolis ordinance was written more narrowly than Chicago's. The same legal framework applied: the Supremacy Clause, federal preemption of immigration enforcement, and whether local governments can limit where federal agents operate. But where the Chicago ordinance had been broad enough that the court found it impermissibly interfered with federal immigration authority, the Minneapolis ordinance survived preliminary scrutiny. Bryan explained the distinction as a lesson in drafting: cities that want to create sensitive-space protections need to write them carefully and narrowly enough to avoid Supremacy Clause preemption. The Minneapolis court's ruling allowed the narrower ordinance to stand — at least for now — as the litigation continued.

Constitutional question: Supremacy Clause and cooperative federalism: states and cities may not obstruct federal immigration enforcement, but the line between obstruction and permissible local regulation is location-specific. A narrowly drawn sensitive-space ordinance may coexist with federal law where a broader one would not.

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