Aloha Friday

December 12, 2025 — Aloha Friday

Dec 12, 2025

1212 AM Aloha TT

Prosecutor Lindsey Halligan — whose cases against both Comey and James were dismissed because she was improperly appointed — went back to the grand jury for a third attempt to indict Letitia James, and was rejected for the third time in a row.

Bryan reported that Halligan's cases against Comey and James had both been dismissed earlier in the week because she had never been properly appointed as a prosecutor — the court found she was only named because her predecessor was unwilling to indict Comey and James in the first place, making the appointment itself constitutionally suspect. The Comey case was effectively dead: inadmissible evidence, a malicious prosecution exposure, and a statute of limitations problem all piling up. But Halligan, apparently unconcerned with her track record, went after the Letitia James grand jury a second time last week and was flatly rejected. Then — the following day — she went back for a third bite at the indictment apple. The grand jury rejected her again. Bryan noted it is rare but not unheard of to seek a fourth indictment after three rejections, and said the question was now how badly Halligan wanted to please the administration and how little shame she had. Bryan offered a self-deprecating aside about his own rubber-duck habit before declining to answer that question.

Constitutional question: Appointments Clause (Art. II, Sec. 2): whether a prosecutor installed specifically because she was willing to bring politically motivated charges — bypassing normal appointment procedures — can constitutionally exercise prosecutorial authority. First Amendment vindictive prosecution dimension: if the cases were brought to punish political opponents, the entire prosecution structure may be constitutionally defective.

Doe v. Dynamic PT 25-180 · 25-180

The Supreme Court issued a unanimous per curiam opinion holding that Louisiana's COVID-era immunity law — which shields healthcare providers from civil liability during a public health crisis — cannot bind federal courts applying federal law.

Louisiana had passed a law immunizing healthcare providers from civil liability for conduct during a public health emergency, such as COVID. A Louisiana plaintiff filed their malpractice claim in federal court. The federal district court dismissed the case based on that Louisiana immunity statute. The Supreme Court reversed, per curiam (author unknown), unanimously. The ruling: Louisiana may bind its own state courts with a state immunity law, but it cannot strip a federal court of its authority to apply federal law. The immunity was a Louisiana immunity — not a federal one. Bryan noted the Court also said the case might still fail on remand; the lower court should rehear it and see if it fails for a proper federal reason. But dismissal based solely on the state immunity statute was error.

Constitutional question: Supremacy Clause and federal judicial power (Article III): state legislatures cannot limit the subject-matter jurisdiction of Article III courts by enacting immunity laws. Federal courts operate under federal authority and may not be constrained by state substantive immunity rules that would bar claims otherwise cognizable under federal law.

Garcia v. Noem 25-cv-02780 · 8:25-cv-02780

A Maryland federal judge granted Kilmar Abrego Garcia's writ of habeas corpus, ordered him released by 5 p.m. — and he was — finding there was no valid final order of removal and therefore no legal basis to hold him in immigration detention.

Bryan reported that the Maryland district court had granted Abrego Garcia's writ of habeas corpus. He used the moment to explain habeas for his audience: a writ of habeas corpus declares that a person is being unlawfully detained and must be released. Immigration detention is supposed to be a temporary holding — like a giant waiting room pending the resolution of removal proceedings — and because it is framed as non-punitive, the government argues it doesn't require the full constitutional protections afforded to criminal detainees. But if that's the government's position, Bryan explained, they have to actually be using the facility as a waiting room, not as de facto imprisonment. The judge had repeatedly asked the government to produce the final order of removal authorizing Abrego Garcia's detention — and repeatedly, the government couldn't produce one. Bryan traced why: in 2019, an immigration judge found Abrego Garcia had good asylum grounds but had missed the one-year application deadline. The judge issued an order saying he couldn't be sent back to El Salvador, but then — Bryan noted this may have been a simple mistake — never issued the separate final order of removal that would have authorized his deportation to a different country. Without that final order, there was no legal authority to hold him in immigration detention. The judge ordered him released by 5 p.m.; he was released. The next morning, he was required to check in at the Baltimore ICE facility, and the judge issued a protective order to prevent ICE from re-detaining him when he arrived.

Constitutional question: Due process (Fifth Amendment): the government's authority to hold a person in civil immigration detention derives from the existence of a valid removal order. Where no such order exists, detention is not a "temporary waiting room" but indefinite civil confinement without legal authority — constitutionally impermissible. Bryan also raised the implicit question: if the DOJ had the file the whole time and could have obtained a proper removal order since 2019, why hadn't they?

Washington v. FEMA 25-cv-12006 · 6

A Massachusetts federal court issued an injunction ordering FEMA to pay out congressionally appropriated disaster mitigation funds the Trump administration had been withholding — and the judge framed it not as a court vs. executive fight, but as a court enforcing Congress's spending decisions against unauthorized executive encroachment.

Congress had appropriated funds to be distributed to states for disaster mitigation projects — programs designed to reduce the impact of future disasters before they occur. When the Trump administration took over in January, it announced that any previously allocated funds that had not yet been spent would be withheld going forward. States had projects underway that were mid-construction. A Massachusetts federal court granted a permanent injunction (or preliminary injunction — Bryan noted it may have been labeled either) ordering FEMA to pay out the funds as allocated. The judge's framing was notable: this was not about a battle between the judiciary and the executive branch. It was about the executive branch's "unlawful encroachment on the prerogative of Congress to appropriate funds for a specific and compelling purpose." Bryan ended with: stick that in your mug and sip it.

Constitutional question: Separation of powers — Appropriations Clause (Art. I, Sec. 9, cl. 7): the executive branch may not impound or refuse to spend funds that Congress has specifically appropriated for a designated purpose. The president's spending authority is limited to execution of congressional appropriations, not substitution of executive policy preferences for legislative spending decisions.

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