SCOTUS AM

December 3, 2025 — SCOTUS AM

Dec 3, 2025
1203 AM TT·AM YT
Mississippi wanted to use a screen to block a six-year-old child accuser from seeing the defendant during testimony — and the question for SCOTUS was whether the Confrontation Clause requires some kind of individual finding before the state can take that step.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to confront witnesses against them — to be in the room, face to face, when accusers testify. The Supreme Court has recognized limited exceptions for child witnesses, particularly in cases involving alleged abuse, where the trauma of facing the defendant directly could affect the child's ability to testify. The key case is Maryland v. Craig (1990), which allowed courts to use one-way video screens if the trial court made an individualized finding that the child would be traumatized by face-to-face confrontation specifically. In Pitts, Mississippi used a physical screen to block the defendant's view during the six-year-old's testimony — but Bryan's question was whether Mississippi conducted any individualized proceeding before doing so. His framing: the Confrontation Clause isn't absolute, but when you override a constitutional guarantee, the Constitution requires you to go on the record and make some finding specific to this child, this defendant, and this case. You can't just routinely deploy a screen for every child witness without that process. The SCOTUS case would determine how much process is required and whether Mississippi's approach cleared the constitutional bar.

Constitutional question: The Confrontation Clause's core purpose is ensuring the reliability of testimony through cross-examination and the psychological pressure of face-to-face accusation. When a state removes that guarantor, even for legitimate reasons, it must show the exception is warranted in this specific case — not just invoke a category of vulnerable witnesses and skip the inquiry.
A sidewalk preacher arrested outside an amphitheater wanted to sue the police under Section 1983 — but the question was whether Heck v. Humphrey blocked his civil rights claim because he'd received a suspended sentence he never actually served.

Section 1983 lets people sue government officials for civil rights violations under color of state law. Heck v. Humphrey (1994) created a major limitation: if your civil rights claim would imply that your criminal conviction was wrong, you can't bring the 1983 claim until the conviction is overturned — because otherwise a civil court could effectively nullify a criminal judgment. Olivier was a sidewalk preacher who was arrested outside a concert venue — there was a 250-foot protest zone around the amphitheater, and he was standing outside it with a bullhorn. He was convicted and received a suspended sentence, meaning he was never actually imprisoned. When he tried to bring a Section 1983 claim challenging the arrest, the question was whether Heck barred him. The problem: Heck's language refers to people "in custody" and talks about habeas corpus as the remedy for people who want to challenge their convictions. Olivier had a conviction on his record, but he'd served no time — there was nothing to habeas his way out of. Bryan used this to explain the tension: if Heck bars people with suspended sentences from bringing 1983 claims, you've created a class of people who can never get relief — they can't bring the civil rights claim (Heck bars it) and they can't use habeas (they're not in custody). The case asked whether Heck applies to non-incarcerated people with suspended sentences, or whether they have a path to 1983 relief.

Constitutional question: Access to courts and the right to remedy: the Constitution does not permit a system where a person whose rights were violated has no avenue for relief. If Heck bars 1983 and habeas requires custody, someone with a suspended sentence falls through the floor — a result the Court must either accept or close by limiting Heck's reach.