Morning Report

November 20, 2025 — Morning Report

Nov 20, 2025

1120 AM TT

Prosecutor Lindsey Halligan confirmed in open court that she had replaced the original indictment approved by the grand jury with a new copy — and then, without presenting it to the grand jury, just told the foreperson to sign the new one — potentially meaning the charges against Comey were never validly filed.

Bryan reported live from the courtroom where prosecutor Halligan confirmed what had previously been reported: she had discarded the three-count indictment that the grand jury had deliberated on and partially approved, replaced it with a new document correcting a major typo (counts two and three of the original were both numbered "count two"), and then instructed the foreperson to sign the new indictment without bringing it back before the full grand jury. Bryan noted the room went dead silent; the judge called Halligan to the bench and asked directly — a second time — whether this was in fact what happened, and she confirmed. Bryan observed that the statute of limitations had now run, meaning even if the original charges were valid, they can no longer be refiled. He added that the legal principle at stake is clear: every lawyer knows you cannot unilaterally fix a mistake on a legal document and pretend it never happened. The correct procedure is to stand up, admit the error on the record, and request leave to correct it — which courts almost always grant. By concealing it, Halligan likely ended the prosecution.

Constitutional question: Fifth Amendment grand jury clause: an indictment must reflect the actual decision of the grand jury. A prosecutor cannot substitute a corrected document and have the foreperson sign it without a new grand jury vote — doing so may mean no valid indictment was ever issued, depriving the court of jurisdiction to proceed.

Garcia v. Noem 25-cv-02780 · 8:25-cv-02780

There was an evidentiary hearing on Kilmar Abrego Garcia's habeas corpus case — the government asked the court to dissolve its injunction blocking deportation to Liberia, claiming his fear lacked credibility and offering foreign-government assurances — but those same assurances had already proven worthless in a Ghana deportation case weeks earlier.

The federal government appeared in court seeking to dissolve the injunction barring Abrego Garcia's removal to Liberia, arguing that his claimed fear of persecution lacked credibility. Bryan explained that under immigration law, credibility determinations about a deportee's fear are largely left to immigration officials — not the court — so that part of the argument had some procedural force. But the government also offered assurances from Liberia that Abrego Garcia would not be mistreated or transferred to a third country where he faced danger. Bryan noted the problem: the same type of assurance had been given in a prior case involving a group of individuals deported to Ghana, who were then immediately sent onward to the very countries where they had claimed fear of torture. The assurance was therefore not credible. Bryan also connected this to the Tennessee criminal case against Abrego Garcia, noting that the government was rushing to deport him because the criminal charges there were weak and risked a vindictive prosecution finding — potentially exposing the attorneys who brought the case to professional discipline. In Tennessee, there were also ex parte communications between the prosecution and the judge (without defense counsel present) about how the government was obtaining its evidence; Abrego Garcia's lawyers sent a letter demanding disclosure, were ghosted, and filed the letter with the judge.

Constitutional question: Due process: whether the government may remove a person to a third country on the basis of foreign-government assurances that have already proven unreliable — and whether the parallel criminal prosecution was filed in retaliation for Abrego Garcia's exercise of his constitutional right to contest his removal (vindictive prosecution, Fifth Amendment due process).

J.G.G. v. Trump 25-cv-00766 · 1:25-cv-00766

After months of appeals, Judge Bosberg concluded he had his marching orders from the higher courts to restart contempt hearings over the administration's failure to stop deportation flights to El Salvador — and when the government tried to object, it had no argument.

Bryan attended the hearing in person. He recapped the timeline: in April, Judge Bosberg had ordered a deportation plane stopped; the plane was not stopped (whether it had already taken off remains unclear). The government appealed Bosberg's ability to even initiate contempt proceedings, tying up the case for months. The Court of Appeals issued an answer that was somewhat ambiguous, but Bosberg read it as clearing him to restart. At the hearing, DOJ objected, arguing that parts of the appellate ruling didn't support Bosberg's plan. Bosberg asked directly: is there any part of the majority opinion that says he can't bring contempt charges? The government went quiet. It had no answer. Bosberg announced he wanted filings from both parties by the end of the week and intended to start the evidentiary hearing the week after Thanksgiving. Government lawyers stammered about witness availability — Bryan predicted subpoenas would clear their calendars fast.

Constitutional question: Separation of powers and rule of law: whether the executive branch's subsequent legal vindication of an action (the appellate court later narrowing the injunction) excuses a failure to comply with the original court order at the time it was issued. Walker v. Birmingham (1967) is the controlling case — no party, however exalted, may substitute its own judgment for a court's order and defy it on the theory that it will later be proved right.

CHC v. Noem 25-cv-12173 · 1:25-cv-12173

The Seventh Circuit stayed the injunction restricting federal agents from using force against protesters, religious practitioners, and journalists — but in the same order explicitly said: don't overread this, we may put very similar restrictions right back in place after full review.

The district court judge in this case had issued a preliminary injunction blocking federal agents from using certain crowd-control techniques against protesters, journalists, and religious practitioners in Chicago, after finding what the Seventh Circuit described as "voluminous and robust factual findings" of potential constitutional violations by federal officers. The night before Bryan's report, the Seventh Circuit stayed that injunction pending appeal. But Bryan walked through the specific language carefully: the circuit court's three concerns were (1) general Article III reluctance to issue orders constraining Article II executive enforcement action; (2) the injunction was too specific — the judge listed every crowd-control device by name, making the order look more like a regulation than a judicial remedy; and (3) the scope was too broad — she enjoined the President, Kristi Noem, and every federal officer. The court then added an explicit caveat: "Do not overread today's order. Our concerns about the substantial overbreadth of the district court's injunction led us to stay it pending appeal, which we will expedite. But we have not concluded that preliminary relief is precluded." Bryan told viewers they rarely see a circuit court say explicitly not to read too much into something — and when they do, you should listen. The court strongly suggested it would re-institute narrower restrictions after reviewing the full record.

Constitutional question: First Amendment rights of protesters, journalists, and religious practitioners against government force used to suppress constitutionally protected activity; separation of powers limits on judicial injunctions directed at executive law enforcement officers.

← November 18, 2025 — Morning Report November 21, 2025 — Aloha Friday →