November 3, 2025 — SCOTUS AM

The League of United Latin American Citizens sued over Executive Order 14248, which made new rules about how voter registration works. Section 2A of the order required the National Male Voter Registration Form to be changed so states had to share with the federal government exactly which citizenship document each voter used to prove eligibility. Bryan explained why this was constitutionally fraught: the Constitution gives states broad authority to determine voter eligibility for themselves. Justice Thomas had been a consistent voice on this in the Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council case — states, not the federal government, control how they verify voters. The district court agreed and issued a permanent injunction on Section 2A. Bryan flagged that an appeal was likely coming, but noted that if Thomas was willing to stand firm on state voter-eligibility authority, a majority might be hard to find against the states on this one.

Bryan used Rico v. US as a vehicle for teaching the purposes of criminal punishment — retributive (you deserve it) and utilitarian (deterrence, incapacitation, reform) — and where supervised release fits. Supervised release is not punishment for the original crime; it's a reformative tool, designed to help people reintegrate and avoid reoffending. It carries a carrot (services, mental health, addiction support) and a stick (higher sentences if you re-offend while on it). Ms. Rico had a troubled history: convicted in 2010, released in 2017, immediately relapsed, sent to inpatient rehab where she succeeded, then released again and disappeared in 2018 when she stopped meeting with her probation officer. Her supervised release was supposed to end in 2021. In 2022, after the formal end date, she was arrested for possession. In 2023, she was brought back before the court for having ghosted her PO in 2018. The government argued she was still on supervised release in 2022 — under the fugitive tolling doctrine, the time she spent evading supervision shouldn't count against her release clock. If that's right, her 2022 possession arrest happened during supervised release and triggers a much harsher penalty for a grade A violation. Bryan's framing: this case is ultimately about what we're trying to accomplish — are we trying to help Ms. Rico or punish her?

In 2016, at a U.S. military base in Afghanistan, a local worker named Ahmed Nayeb was hired by a Fluor subcontractor to work the overnight shift. Nayeb was a Taliban operative; the U.S. military apparently knew he had Taliban ties but never told Fluor. Nayeb set off a device that killed approximately five people and injured seventeen, including Hencely. Hencely sued Fluor for negligent hiring and supervision. Fluor argued it was protected by derivative sovereign immunity under Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. (1988) — the principle that government contractors performing military work under government direction can claim some of the government's immunity from suit. Bryan explained Boyle: the case arose from a helicopter design flaw that killed a Marine pilot, and the Court held that the contractor was immune because it was executing a government contract. Bryan noted Boyle has been widely criticized for both its outcome and its reasoning. Hencely's argument: even if Boyle is good law, it shouldn't extend to a case where the government's own evaluation found the contractor negligently failed to supervise its employee, and where the government itself failed to share critical security information about the worker. The case also raised the question of whether Boyle should be revisited entirely.