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Morning Report

October 21, 2025 — Morning Report

Oct 21, 2025
1021 AM TT
AFGE v. OPM 25-cv-01780 · 3:25-cv-01780
Bryan opened with a lighter one — a bizarre third-party filing that appeared in a closed AFGE v. OPM case. A person with no connection to the case filed something incoherent about a family law matter in California, a missing car in North Carolina, and something about Ted Cruz. The real heart of the filing: he wanted the return of his sacred thread, which marks the beginning of a lifelong spiritual journey in Hinduism. The judge dismissed it. Bryan: "I hope the guy manages to get his car and sacred thread back, although it appears they've been lost since 2008, so I'm not super optimistic."

The main AFGE v. OPM case (3:25-cv-01780, the Northern District of California challenge to OPM's role in mass federal workforce reductions under DOGE) was already closed — fully resolved at the district court level as of the time Bryan reported. A few days before October 21, a third party with no standing in the case filed a document in the docket. The filing was not coherent legal argumentation. It referenced a family law dispute in California, a missing car in North Carolina, and Ted Cruz. Buried in the middle of a long paragraph listing things the filer had lost — including his house, his car keys, and his car — was a request for the return of his sacred thread, a Hindu religious object marking the beginning of a lifelong spiritual journey. The judge who received the filing responded despite having no obligation to: "In this post-judgment matter, a third party pleads for the return of sacred thread among other requests, not always coherently stated, but which appear to have been denied in actions pending in other jurisdictions. All these requests for relief, now being made to all judges and senators and others beside, this court lacks jurisdiction to consider any of these requests. The third party filing is dismissed." Bryan used it as a light opening to a heavy news day.

Standingjurisdiction
Constitutional question: No constitutional dimension to this story. Bryan used it structurally — a moment of levity before heavy material about the Oregon National Guard and the Alina Haba appointment fight — rather than as legal analysis. The religious dimension of the sacred thread request touches Article I, §9 (no establishment, free exercise) only in the most attenuated way.
Oregon v. Trump 25-6268 · 25-6268
The Ninth Circuit issued a stay pending appeal in Portland Oregon v. Trump — and it's confusing. There were two TROs. The 9th Circuit stayed TRO number one. The government never formally appealed TRO number two, but argued at oral argument that staying one meant staying both. The court seemed to agree in a footnote. Net result: federalization probably allowed, deployment maybe, but TRO two is technically still there. Bryan also published a correction after his earlier video incorrectly said the decision "allowed deployment." It doesn't — not clearly.

Bryan had to correct his earlier same-day video about the Oregon National Guard: he had said the Ninth Circuit's decision allowed the administration to deploy the National Guard in Portland, but it didn't — only to federalize. In the full Morning Report, he untangled two separate TROs. TRO number one: the original district court order blocking both federalization and deployment of the Oregon National Guard. TRO number two: a second TRO blocking deployment of any National Guard into Oregon (including troops from Texas or California) after the administration tried to send non-Oregon troops as a workaround. The 9th Circuit's stay: it addressed only TRO number one — pausing it pending appeal. The government had never formally appealed TRO number two. At oral argument, the government's position was that since the two TROs were "so similar," staying one should stay both. In footnote 8 of the opinion, the Ninth Circuit seemed to agree — but never said explicitly that TRO two was dissolved. Bryan's bottom line: the 9th Circuit "mostly allowed" federalization and maybe deployment, but "technically there's an argument that the second TRO still stops deployment." The governor and AG of Oregon also called for rehearing en banc. Bryan's substantive take on the decision itself: he'd read it and thought it mischaracterized some history he knew well, but "until somebody gives me a black robe, my opinion is completely irrelevant." The real constitutional question — who gets to decide whether conditions justify National Guard deployment, the president or Congress? — is a statutory interpretation issue, not purely constitutional. Bryan: if you don't like how the court reads the statute, "elect new statute writers. That's the fix."

10th Amendmentpresidential authority to federalize and deploy National GuardTRO stay pending appeal10 U.S.C. § 12406
Constitutional question: Bryan identified the core constitutional question precisely: who the law says gets to make the call about whether conditions justify deploying National Guard — not what most people think about whether conditions justify it. The 9th Circuit's majority (2-1) found Congress wrote the statute to let the president decide; one judge dissented; a concurrence reportedly "greatly mischaracterized the history." Critically, Bryan emphasized this is a statutory interpretation question, not a constitutional one: if Congress disagrees with how courts read § 12406, Congress can amend the statute. The constitutional floor (10th Amendment state sovereignty, commander-in-chief power) doesn't determine the outcome — the statute's text and Congress's intent do. This is a significant framing distinction from cases where the constitutional limit is the binding constraint.
US v. Giraud 25-2635 · 25-2635
Alina Haba was before the Third Circuit defending her reappointment as US Attorney for New Jersey. The story: the district court judges in NJ voted to replace her after her 120-day interim term expired. Trump fired their choice and reappointed Haba. When the Third Circuit judge asked Trump's lawyer for a single prior example of that sequence of events, the answer was: "I guess I cannot." Bryan: "So much for consistent with long-standing practice."

The case involves a challenge to Alina Haba's continued authority as US Attorney for the District of New Jersey. Under 28 U.S.C. § 546(d), a president can appoint an interim US attorney for up to 120 days; after 120 days, the district court judges in that district vote to appoint a replacement. On July 22, 2025, the NJ district court judges exercised that authority and appointed Desire Lee Grace as the new US Attorney. The Trump administration immediately fired Grace and reappointed Haba — a move Bryan flagged as the same pattern as the Comey/James/Bolton appointment constellation: the administration treating appointment law as optional when it produced inconvenient outcomes. The Third Circuit heard argument on October 20 in the appeal by Giraud (a defendant in a federal criminal case whose prosecution Haba was overseeing, and who challenged her authority to prosecute). The Trump administration's lawyer argued the reappointment was "consistent with long-standing practice." The Third Circuit judge asked the lawyer to name a single prior example of this sequence of events — a president firing a district-court-appointed US attorney and reimposing the expired interim. The lawyer acknowledged he could not. The Third Circuit did not issue an immediate ruling; Bryan said he'd report back when it came down.

28 U.S.C. § 546(d)interim US attorney appointmentdistrict court's authority to appoint after 120-day term expiresAppointments Clause (Art. II, §2)
Constitutional question: The Appointments Clause architecture: principal officers (including US attorneys) require Senate confirmation; interim appointments are a narrow, time-limited exception. The 120-day rule and district court fallback in § 546(d) are Congress's implementation of the Appointments Clause's requirement that there be a lawful authority behind every principal-officer appointment. When the executive fires the district court's choice and reimports an expired interim, it is asserting that presidential preference can override both the Appointments Clause statutory framework and a co-equal branch's appointment decision. The Third Circuit's skepticism — asking for a single prior precedent, finding none — suggests the court views the administration's claim as novel, not traditional practice. The pattern mirrors the Comey/James appointment challenges: a single broken link in the appointment chain can unwind every prosecution that flowed through it.
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