The Supreme Court agreed to hear the tariff case. They'll consolidate Trump v. VOS and Learning Resources v. Trump and hear arguments in the first week of November — briefs due in weeks. The main question: did the president use IEEPA — the emergency tariff law — in a way Congress intended? Bryan: "This may be one of the first big substantive tests between the branches before the court in this Trump term. Most prior SCOTUS decisions have been procedural or temporary victories. We may finally find out what this court is really made of."
Trump v. VOS (25-5202) is the Supreme Court case arising from the tariff litigation. The Supreme Court agreed to hear Trump's appeal in the tariff case on an expedited schedule, consolidating Trump v. VOS and Learning Resources v. Trump (two related IEEPA tariff challenges). Oral arguments are scheduled for the first week of November, with briefs due within weeks. The main legal question is whether the president used IEEPA (the International Emergency Economic Powers Act) in the manner Congress intended when it delegated tariff-setting power. Bryan's framework: tariff powers belong exclusively to Congress under Article I; Congress can delegate that power to the president with strings attached, but he can only use the delegated power within those strings — he cannot cross-apply one tariff authority's scope to another purpose. Delegated powers must be interpreted narrowly. Bryan flagged that prior SCOTUS decisions in Trump-related cases had been mostly procedural or temporary: this case is positioned to be a genuinely substantive separation of powers ruling on whether the executive stayed within Congress's grant of authority. (Note: Trump v. V.O.S. 25-1812 was the circuit court stage of this case reported September 5; 25-5202 is the SCOTUS cert-granted docket number.)
IEEPAtariff delegationCongress's plenary tariff powernarrow construction of delegated powersexpedited SCOTUS scheduleconsolidation with Learning Resources v. Trump
Constitutional question: Article I vests the tariff power in Congress; delegating it to the president requires clear statutory language, and the scope of the delegation is determined by what Congress actually wrote. The non-delegation doctrine (as currently interpreted after its Schechter-to-Whitman evolution) allows Congress to delegate authority as long as it provides an "intelligible principle" guiding the executive. The tariff case asks whether IEEPA provides such a principle for the scope of tariffs Trump imposed, or whether the administration read discretionary authority into language Congress never intended for blanket tariff use. Bryan's observation that the conservative justices haven't yet written any "telling" opinions on this question is accurate: the tariff ruling will be the first major economic-power separation-of-powers decision under this Court.
New Mexico sued Musk over DOGE: you were never confirmed by Congress, you were never properly appointed, but you were making huge decisions about the government. Joined with Japanese American Citizens League v. Musk, which is about grants that got cut off with no oversight. The DOJ is now filing the Barrett COFC argument in every single DOGE/grant case — one justice's opinion isn't binding, but they're betting something will stick. The judge in this case hasn't responded yet.
New Mexico v. Musk (25-cv-00429) is joined with Japanese American Citizens League v. Musk and involves two distinct legal theories about Elon Musk's role running DOGE. The New Mexico case argues Musk violated law by exercising major government decision-making authority without Senate confirmation — the Appointments Clause problem Bryan had noted from the beginning. The JACL case is focused on grants that were cut off by DOGE without oversight or process. In this case, the DOJ filed a motion arguing the case should be dismissed or transferred to the Court of Federal Claims (COFC) — citing Justice Barrett's solo opinion in NIH v. APHA, which suggested grant disputes belong in COFC rather than district court. But: Barrett was the only justice to sign that reasoning. It was a plurality opinion, not binding. The plaintiffs pushed back citing the Harvard v. HHS ruling, where the judge rejected the same argument: one justice's opinion carries the force of a dissent, not precedent. The judge in NM v. Musk hadn't responded as of September 10. Bryan's read: the DOJ is filing this motion in every DOGE-related case as a "spaghetti at the wall" strategy, hoping something sticks before an appeals court shuts it down definitively.
Appointments ClauseDOGEMusk appointment (no confirmation)COFC Barrett opinion (not binding)grant termination without processspaghetti-at-the-wall DOJ strategyHarvard v. HHS analogy
Constitutional question: The Appointments Clause (Art. II, §2) requires that officers of the United States be appointed by the president with Senate confirmation (principal officers) or by the president alone, courts, or department heads (inferior officers). It exists to ensure accountability: if someone exercises significant government authority, there must be a documented appointment process that gives the Senate (and the public) visibility into who holds that power. Musk's role at DOGE — making decisions about which agencies, grants, and programs to cut — is exactly the kind of government authority the Appointments Clause was designed to constrain. The "he wasn't getting paid, so he didn't really work there" theory the administration used early on collapses under the clause's logic: compensation has nothing to do with constitutional appointment requirements.
A wind energy project off the coast of Rhode Island was 90% built after years of environmental studies and engineering work. The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management issued a stop-work order. The stop-work order doesn't cite a law. It doesn't cite a safety violation. It doesn't cite a regulation. It doesn't cite a specific concern. It just says BOEM is in charge of projects on the continental shelf. That's it. Rhode Island sued. You have to tell us what we did wrong.
Rhode Island v. Department of Interior (25-cv-00439) challenges a stop-work order issued by the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) against a wind energy project off the Rhode Island coast. The project had been in development for years, with completed environmental studies and engineering work, and was approximately 90% built when BOEM issued the stop-work order. The stated reason in the order: BOEM needed to address unspecified "concerns." The order didn't cite a legal provision, safety violation, regulation, or specific code the project had violated. It simply invoked BOEM's general authority over projects on the continental shelf. Rhode Island filed a new lawsuit challenging the order on due process and APA grounds. The lawsuit's core argument: the government cannot issue a stop-work order without explaining what law or regulation was violated. Bryan: basic due process requires the government to tell you what you did wrong and then demonstrate it. Bryan noted this was part of a broader pattern — the administration had stopped or slowed multiple wind and solar projects.
APAarbitrary and capriciousBOEM stop-work orderno stated legal basisdue process (notice of violation)wind energycontinental shelf jurisdiction
Constitutional question: The due process clause requires that when the government restricts private activity, it must provide notice of the basis for the restriction and an opportunity to respond. A stop-work order against a nearly complete infrastructure project — with no stated legal violation — deprives the project developer of property interests without the process the Fifth Amendment guarantees. The APA's arbitrary and capricious standard operationalizes this requirement: agency action that doesn't explain its reasoning or cite its legal authority isn't "reasoned decision-making" in any administrative law sense. The broader political context — a pattern of anti-wind-energy enforcement — is relevant to the APA analysis: courts can consider whether the agency's stated (or unstated) reason is pretextual when there is evidence of a policy objective to stop certain types of projects regardless of their compliance status.
In July, the Wall Street Journal reported on a letter Trump wrote in a Jeffrey Epstein birthday book — a bit cryptic, a bit blue, an abstract drawing of a nude woman. Trump said the letter didn't exist and was a fabrication. He sued the WSJ, News Corp, Rupert Murdoch, and the journalists for billions of dollars. Yesterday: the birthday book became publicly available. The letter is in it. Bryan: "The two parties filed a joint agreement on the discovery motion and there's really been nothing since. Cases don't just disappear. Someone will have to continue or withdraw."
Trump v. Murdoch (25-cv-23232) is Trump's defamation lawsuit against the Wall Street Journal, its parent company News Corp, Rupert Murdoch, and the journalists who reported on Trump's letter in an Epstein birthday book. On July 17, the WSJ published an article about the letter — at the time, no one had actually seen it. Trump and his team stated it didn't exist and was a fabrication. He sued for billions of dollars in damages. On July 28, Trump urgently demanded to immediately depose Rupert Murdoch, insisting Murdoch was too old to wait. Then, in August: the two parties filed a joint agreement on the discovery motion. After that, nothing. On September 9, the Epstein birthday book became publicly available, with the letter inside — available for download from Bryan's shared documents under "Epstein Evidence" (with a content warning). As of September 10, the case had been quiet. Bryan: cases don't just disappear. Trump has a long history of using defamation suits as leverage to suppress bad stories — the mere threat of litigation can achieve the goal of silence. Evidence of withdrawal could be used against him in future defamation cases, and the First Amendment issues are tightly intertwined with other ongoing litigation. Worth watching.
DefamationFirst AmendmentEpstein birthday bookWSJ articleMurdoch deposition demand (urgency claim)joint discovery agreementcase status (quiet)
Constitutional question: Defamation law and the First Amendment are constitutionally intertwined under New York Times v. Sullivan (1964): public figures must prove actual malice — knowing falsity or reckless disregard for the truth — to prevail. Trump is a public figure in the paradigm case. His claim that the letter didn't exist — when it did — would make proving the WSJ's "reckless disregard" nearly impossible once the letter itself is publicly available. The case's trajectory also intersects with a broader pattern in the Trump 2025 term: First Amendment litigation is emerging as a structural check on government retaliation, and a de facto admission in this case that the WSJ's reporting was accurate could have downstream effects in cases where Trump-administration actors claim government action wasn't driven by hostility to accurate reporting.
