April 29, 2026 — SCOTUS AM

Mullin v. Doe was argued in combination with Trump v. Miot — the two cases both asked the same core question about TPS, but for different nationalities (Syrians in Mullin, Haitians in Miot). Bryan explained TPS as a pause button: when a country becomes unsafe due to war, natural disaster, or other extraordinary conditions, DHS can grant TPS to nationals of that country in the US, freezing their immigration proceedings for 6-18 months. When the period ends, DHS reviews conditions and can renew. When Trump took office, approximately 13 countries had TPS designations. The administration moved to cancel all of them simultaneously. Three issues were before the Court. First: the statute says the DHS secretary gets to "determine" whether conditions warrant TPS — but the executive branch argued that determination is unreviewable, while challengers argued courts can at least review whether the secretary made a determination at all. Second: Kristi Noem canceled all TPS designations at once, and the record showed very little review before those decisions — and some evidence the decisions were made on political grounds, not an assessment of whether countries were safe. Bryan noted that what's in an official's head may be unreviewable, but what's in writing matters — if the official record reflects a political rationale rather than a safety determination, that's a different legal problem. Third: equal protection — though Bryan was skeptical, noting the rational review standard is low. He flagged the significance: this was the first time TPS cancellations had reached SCOTUS argument, making it one of the most significant immigration cases of the term.

Trump v. Miot raised the same legal issues as Mullin v. Doe but for Haitian TPS beneficiaries. The cases were combined at oral argument with separate lawyers for each group. Bryan's practical observation: the legal win would be narrow even if the challengers prevailed — TPS status for Haitians was already scheduled to expire in July 2026, so winning a reinstatement of TPS now would buy perhaps a couple of months before the status lapsed through its own terms. That observation reflected a broader pattern Bryan tracked throughout the term: even successful litigation in federal courts often produced temporary relief that the administration could circumvent through the natural expiration of policies or by pursuing the same goal through a different mechanism. The Haitian TPS case was also notable because Haiti had been in ongoing crisis conditions — the statutory question of whether it was "safe" to return was facially difficult to answer in the affirmative, which raised the question of whether any DHS secretary could make a reviewable determination that Haiti had become safe enough to terminate TPS without a factual record supporting that conclusion.

Bryan used Hikma v. Amarin to explain the mechanics of pharmaceutical patent law and the "skinny label" system. When a brand-name drug's patent expires, generic manufacturers can sell the same compound but must use "skinny labels" that exclude any uses still under patent. The drug at issue: icosapent ethyl (marketed by Amarin as Vascepa). The compound had two uses. The original patent-expired use: treating very high triglycerides (hypertriglyceridemia). Amarin's separately patented use: reducing cardiovascular risk in patients with moderately elevated triglycerides — a different patient population. Hikma manufactured a generic version with a skinny label that complied with the rules — it only described the unpatented indication. But Hikma also sent out marketing materials calling its product "Generic Vascepa." Vascepa is Amarin's brand name covering the cardiovascular patent. Amarin sued for induced infringement — the theory that Hikma intentionally encouraged doctors or pharmacists to substitute its generic for Vascepa prescriptions intended for the cardiovascular indication, thereby infringing Amarin's patent. The questions for SCOTUS: (1) Does label compliance provide a safe harbor against induced infringement, or can marketing materials outside the label create liability? (2) Does induced infringement require affirmative steps to encourage infringement, or is calling the product "Generic Vascepa" — when it is chemically identical — enough? Bryan noted his personal skepticism about the underlying patent: the same compound treating the same basic condition (high triglycerides) at a different dose level struck him as potentially failing the non-obviousness requirement, but that wasn't what the Court had agreed to address.