April 27, 2026 — SCOTUS AM (Spring Arguments Day 4)

A bank robbery outside Richmond, Virginia. No suspects, no leads. The cops wrote a warrant for geofencing data — the location data apps like Google and Meta collect from towers and Bluetooth about a user's position, accurate to within a couple of feet. But geofencing is different from cell site location information (CSLI, the kind *Carpenter v. US* (2018) covered). With CSLI, one tower collects the data. With geofencing, Google had to search through millions of users' records to find anyone within 150 meters of the bank during a 60-minute window. Then — using authority from the original warrant but without seeking new warrants — the police narrowed the list further and asked Google to provide more detail about movement. Then they unmasked three individuals from the refined list. One of them was Mr. Chatrie. Convicted of robbery. *Carpenter* (2018) said courts analyzing warrantless digital location collection should consider how much the data reveals, the volume collected, and whether users voluntarily provided it. Google users had to opt in to location tracking, and about two-thirds didn't. Here there was a warrant — but was one warrant enough for three separate requests for increasingly specific data? The court had also flagged (but not in the original warrant) that two of the three data requests were made without going back to the judge. There was also a general warrant problem: the 4th Amendment prohibits warrants that don't specify what's being looked for. Both sides disagreed on whether a geofence warrant asking for "anyone in this area" was too general to begin with. Bryan cut six pages from his script. There was a lot missing. But those were the pressure points.

Monsanto makes Roundup, which contains glyphosate. The EPA has tested glyphosate and declared it safe. The WHO tested it and says it's linked to cancer. Monsanto has not added a cancer warning. John Durnell was diagnosed with non-Hodgkin's lymphoma and sued under Missouri labeling law. The federal preemption question: Congress passed the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) and included a preemption clause barring any state labeling law that "supplements or departs from" FIFRA. The EPA, executing FIFRA, has determined glyphosate doesn't require a cancer warning. Missouri law says nearly the same thing as FIFRA — "truthful and adequate" warnings required, "misleading or inadequate" warnings prohibited. Almost word for word. Missouri is not claiming its law requires more than FIFRA. It's saying FIFRA itself requires a cancer warning — and the EPA's determination that it doesn't is wrong. The post-*Loper Bright* wrinkle: courts are no longer required to defer to agency interpretations of statutes. If the court no longer has to accept the EPA's determination that glyphosate is safe, can Missouri courts evaluate that question independently? Or does FIFRA's preemption clause bar state law from contradicting the EPA regardless of whether the EPA is right? Bryan's policy layer: RFK Jr. had campaigned on banning glyphosate. Trump issued an executive order saying no US regulation could restrict glyphosate production. Policy is for policymakers — that question was settled by the election. The legal question is what the law as written actually requires on labels. Bryan wanted listeners to watch for policy questions slipping into the oral argument and notice when the court tried to avoid answering them. Also in the background: Monsanto was considering a $7 billion settlement to resolve cancer claims.