April 22, 2026 — SCOTUS AM (Spring Arguments Day 3)

A deeply statute-heavy immigration case. Bryan's vocab primer: a lawful permanent resident (LPR / green card holder) generally doesn't need to be "admitted" when returning to the US — they can open the velvet rope themselves. But 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(13)(C)(v) says LPRs "may" be treated as seeking admission if they've committed certain offenses, including crimes of moral turpitude (fraud-adjacent crimes being the clearest example). Mr. Lau, an LPR, had been accused of third-degree trademark counterfeiting — fraud adjacent — before he returned from a trip to China in 2012. The border agent stopped him, treated him as seeking admission, and paroled him into the country instead of admitting him. About a year later, Lau took a plea deal (two years' probation). The feds then said: you were never admitted, you've committed a crime of moral turpitude, you're removable. The Second Circuit said: before a border agent can treat an LPR as seeking admission, the agent needs clear and convincing evidence that a crime occurred. That's a high standard — more than a preponderance, less than reasonable doubt. An accusation isn't enough. The circuit declined to decide whether counterfeiting was actually a crime of moral turpitude — because the agent hadn't cleared the evidentiary threshold, the merits question didn't arise. Bryan's note: the agent was actually correct as a matter of law — Lau had committed the crime before he walked through customs, even though he didn't plead guilty until later. But how much did the agent need to know at that moment? That's the question. Also unresolved: whether the crime fell under the "petty offense" exception (max sentence over a year, but Lau only got probation). Bryan flagged these would likely come up.