SCOTUS AM

April 20, 2026 — SCOTUS AM (Spring Arguments Day 1)

Apr 20, 2026

042026 TMR — It's 4/20, Kavanaugh and Gorsuch harmonizing somewhere

Striptease v. SEC (Stipetch v. SEC) · 25-466

A man sold unregistered securities, got convicted criminally, served 21 months — and then the SEC made him give back his profits too. He says he didn't hurt anybody. The question is whether that matters.

Bryan called it "Striptease" because "Stipetch" was a lost cause. The backstory on securities law: after 1929, Congress passed laws requiring publicly traded companies to disclose everything — the whole thesis being that if investors can't make decisions for the company, they at least deserve to see through the glass wall before they put their money in. The SEC enforces those disclosure laws. In this case, the defendant sold unlicensed securities — not complying with disclosure requirements, not actually defrauding anyone in the sense that investors lost money. He got a criminal conviction and 21 months. Then the SEC won a civil case and required disgorgement — giving back all his profits. He argued: no one lost anything, so I should get to keep what I made. The case turned on a 2021 SCOTUS ruling called *Liu v. SEC*, which said disgorgement is available as long as the amount equals actual profits and is awarded "for victims." The man's argument: I have no victims. But the Laycock amicus brief landed differently — disgorgement is an equitable remedy focused on the wrongdoer's unjust enrichment, not the victims' losses. Bryan's note: Gorsuch and Thomas were both skeptical of equitable remedies generally, so keep eyes on them.

Constitutional question: The outer limits of SEC civil enforcement power — specifically whether disgorgement requires proof of victim harm, and whether the court's recent skepticism of agency equitable remedies limits it further.

T.M. v. University of Maryland Medical System · 25-197

The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine is confusing enough that lower courts apparently like to use it to dump cases. SCOTUS is here to mop up.

TM was diagnosed by her own doctor with a rare genetic condition causing psychosis after gluten exposure. After an episode, she was taken to the hospital, where doctors disagreed with her doctor's diagnosis, diagnosed her with schizophrenia, admitted her involuntarily, and administered antipsychotics. Whether they were right or wrong wasn't the question before SCOTUS — Bryan: "I technically don't know which is correct. Either really is possible." TM contested the involuntary commitment, went through an administrative process including a hearing before an ALJ (who upheld the hospital), a series of state court appeals, and eventually a consent order. She argued the consent order violated her constitutional rights. She brought her case to federal district court on federal question grounds. The district court dismissed it under the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine — which bars federal district courts from reviewing state court judgments, specifically when the injury being claimed is the judgment itself. But TM's case hadn't completed its state court journey — it was at an intermediate level, not the state supreme court. And Rooker and Feldman both involved final decisions from the highest state court. Is the doctrine even triggered if the state court proceedings weren't final? The hospital's counter: if you can't appeal state supreme court decisions to the district court, can you really appeal regular state court decisions before they're even done? "That can't be right either." Bryan's take: this whole thing is "clear as mud," and the court was basically here to wipe the floor.

Constitutional question: The line between federal courts' review of constitutional claims and the prohibition on using the district court as an appeals court for state court decisions.

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