SCOTUS AM

March 25, 2026 — SCOTUS AM (March Madness Day 3)

Mar 25, 2026
0325 March SCOTUS News Update daily AM YT
Anthropic v. Department of Defense (Post-Hearing Update) · 26-cv-01996
The Department of Justice burned Pete Hegseth at his own hearing — and then tried to get the case dismissed for it.

The day after the hearing, Bryan recapped: the DOJ attorney had immediately conceded that Hegseth lacked authority to extend the Anthropic ban to other agencies, retracting 80% of the complaint. Then the government tried to use that retraction as grounds to dismiss — arguing that with less harm now, there was no case. The judge pushed back: what guarantee is there they won't reverse course again? No guarantee was given. The remaining DOD argument was that Anthropic had crossed an "uncrossable line" by questioning any DOD policy at all — therefore becoming untrustworthy — and that allowing "sanctimonious rhetoric" to constrain DOD would someday lead to secret backdoors in AI systems. Bryan wasn't being sarcastic. New filings were due within 24 hours.

Constitutional question: Whether the executive can penalize a private contractor for protected speech by revoking government contracts without due process.
Flowers Food v. Brock · 24-935
Angelo Brock delivers baked goods entirely within Colorado. He's subject to the Federal Arbitration Act because the bread came from another state. But he might not be covered by the FAA exemption — because the bread came from another state. Same fact. Both directions.

The Federal Arbitration Act (1925) makes arbitration agreements enforceable — and because of creative interstate commerce arguments, it covers almost any contract in the country. The Terminex example: an Alabama homeowner couldn't escape arbitration because Terminex bought the spray in another state. But the FAA has an exemption for transportation workers engaged in interstate commerce. The catch: even though Brock's bread comes from out of state (making the FAA apply to him), the Fifth Circuit ruled that since he doesn't cross state lines himself, he's not "engaged in interstate commerce" for purposes of the exemption. Same words, two different outcomes depending on which direction you're walking through the statute. Bryan would love the court to compare these two uses directly — he doubts they will. The actual argument is narrower: whether Brock qualifies as a "last-leg driver" independent contractor, or whether his integration into Flower Foods' interstate delivery chain brings him under the exemption.

Constitutional question: The scope of Congress's Commerce Clause power — and whether "interstate commerce" can simultaneously mean two different things within the same statute, depending on which provision triggers it.