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Delligatti v. United States

No. 23-825 SCOTUS · Decided SCOTUS
Cert Granted: Jun 3, 2024 Argued: Nov 12, 2024 Decided: Mar 21, 2025
📄 Read the Opinion


The Law · How the Case Works

Overview

Overview

Delligatti v. United States held that solicitation to commit first-degree murder qualifies as a 'crime of violence' under the elements clause of 18 U.S.C. Section 924(c)(3)(A), which covers offenses that have as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another person. The Court held that an inchoate offense can satisfy the elements clause so long as the completed crime it targets necessarily involves such physical force, and that murder by its nature meets this test.

The Facts

Facts

Joseph Delligatti, an organized crime figure, ordered and arranged the killing of a rival. He was convicted under RICO and a related Section 924(c) firearm charge predicated on his solicitation of murder as the underlying crime of violence. Delligatti argued that solicitation, as an inchoate offense, does not itself require the use of physical force and therefore cannot qualify as a crime of violence under the elements clause.

The Issue

Issue

Whether solicitation to commit first-degree murder satisfies the elements clause of Section 924(c)(3)(A) as a 'crime of violence' with as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.

The Rules

Rule

Solicitation to commit first-degree murder qualifies as a crime of violence under the elements clause. Because first-degree murder necessarily involves the use of deadly physical force against a person, and because solicitation requires as its object the commission of that completed offense, the solicitation charge necessarily involves physical force against a person as a required element.

The Application

Analysis

Delligatti, an organized crime figure, challenged his Section 924(c) firearm conviction by arguing that solicitation, an inchoate offense that does not itself use physical force, cannot qualify as a crime of violence. The Court rejected this argument by holding that the elements clause looks to whether the target crime (first-degree murder) necessarily involves physical force, not whether the inchoate offense itself does. Because Delligatti's solicitation was directed at a murder, which by definition involves deadly force against a person, the solicitation satisfied the statutory requirement. The Court thus affirmed that an organized crime figure who orders a killing can face enhanced penalties for possessing a firearm in connection with that solicitation.

The Conclusion

Conclusion

The Court affirmed Delligatti's Section 924(c) conviction. Thomas wrote the majority opinion. The ruling resolves how the elements clause applies to inchoate offenses and holds that courts look to the completed offense that the inchoate crime targets when assessing whether that crime of violence element is satisfied.

The Record · 1 original document
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
FiledJan 31, 2024
CL Statusterminated
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No circuit court data for this case.

Cert GrantedJun 3, 2024
Statusterminated
Filed (CL)Jan 31, 2024
View on CourtListener →
SCOTUS TMR-7d56a548 Aug 8, 2026

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