Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel

The removal statute has always been strict. Congress wrote it to say defendants get 30 days to move a case to federal court, with two narrow exceptions: Confederated Tribes (foreign sovereignty) and Avco (ERISA preemption). When the statute says 30 days, courts have historically read it as 30 days—no more. The statute serves a purpose: state courts get finality, federal diversity jurisdiction flows from state court authority rather than defendant whim, and predictability reigns. If Enbridge could show up six months later and remove on the theory that equitable tolling applies, state courts would lose control over their own dockets.

Enbridge's argument had surface appeal: the deadline is not technically jurisdictional (removing a case doesn't violate Article III or statutory grant of federal jurisdiction), so why shouldn't equitable tolling apply? But the Court had made clear in Boechler that nonjurisdictional rules can still be mandatory. A rule can be nonjurisdictional but still absolutely binding—like a procedural bar on filing or a statute of limitations. The §1446(b)(1) deadline is that kind of rule. It is procedural, binding, and not waivable by equitable exception. The text says 30 days. The 30 days are up. Late removal fails.

Enbridge also argued that the removal statute had developed a split among the Courts of Appeals: some allowed equitable tolling, others did not. The grant of certiorari was to resolve the split. But resolving a split does not require accepting the more permissive rule. The Court unified the law by holding that equitable tolling does not apply. The deadline is absolute. This protects state court authority and prevents defendants from gaming removal timing.